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Abstract
We study fair allocation of indivisible goods to agents with unequal entitlements. Fair alloca-
tion has been the subject of many studies in both divisible and indivisible settings. Our emphasis
is on the case where the goods are indivisible and agents have unequal entitlements. This prob-
lem is a generalization of the work by Procaccia and Wang [20] wherein the agents are assumed
to be symmetric with respect to their entitlements. Although Procaccia and Wang show an
almost fair (constant approximation) allocation exists in their setting, our main result is in
sharp contrast to their observation. We show that, in some cases with n agents, no allocation
can guarantee better than 1/n approximation of a fair allocation when the entitlements are not
necessarily equal. Furthermore, we devise a simple algorithm that ensures a 1/n approximation
guarantee.
Our second result is for a restricted version of the problem where the valuation of every agent
for each good is bounded by the total value he wishes to receive in a fair allocation. Although
this assumption might seem w.l.o.g, we show it enables us to find a 1/2 approximation fair
allocation via a greedy algorithm. Finally, we run some experiments on real-world data and
show that, in practice, a fair allocation is likely to exist. We also support our experiments by
showing positive results for two stochastic variants of the problem, namely stochastic agents and
stochastic items.
1 Introduction
In this work, we conduct a study of fairly allocating indivisible goods among n agents with unequal
claims on the goods. Fair allocation is a very fundamental problem that has received attention
in both Computer Science and Economics. This problem dates back to 1948 when Steinhaus [23]
introduced the cake cutting problem as follows: given n agents with different valuation functions
for a cake, is it possible to divide the cake between them in such a way that every agent receives a
piece whose value to him is at least 1/n of the whole cake? Steinhaus answered this question in the
affirmative by proposing a simple and elegant algorithm which is called moving knife. Although this
problem admits a straightforward solution, several ramifications of the cake cutting problem have
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been studied since then, many of which have not been settled after decades [7, 21, 11, 19, 14, 12,
24, 10, 1, 6, 3]. For instance, a natural generalization of the problem in which we discriminate the
agents based on their entitlements is still open. In this problem, every agent claims an entitlement
ei to the cake such that
∑
ei = 1, and the goal is to cut the cake into disproportional pieces and
allocate them to the agents such that every agent ai’s valuation for his piece is at least ei fraction
of his valuation for the entire cake. For two agents, Brams et al. [5] showed that at least two cuts
are necessary to divide the cake between the agents. Furthermore, Robertson et al. [22] proposed
a modified version of cut and choose method to divide the cake between two agents with portions
e1, e2, where e1 and e2 are real numbers. McAvaney, Robertson, and Web [18] considered the case
when the entitlements are rational numbers. They used Ramsey partitions to show that when the
entitlements are rational, one can make a proper division via O(n3) cuts.
Recently, a new line of research is focused on the fair allocation of indivisible goods. In contrast
to the conventional cake cutting problem, in this problem instead of a heterogeneous cake, we have
a setM of indivisible goods and we wish to distribute them among n agents. Indeed, due to trivial
counterexamples in this setting1, the previous guarantee, that is every agent should obtain 1/n of
his valuation for all items from his allocated set, is impossible to deliver. To alleviate this problem,
Budish [8] proposed a concept of fairness for the allocation of indivisible goods namely the maxmin
share. Suppose we ask an agent ai to divide the items between the agents in a way that he thinks
is fair to everybody. Of course, agent ai does not take into account other agents’ valuations and
only incorporates his valuation function in the allocation. Based on this, we define MMSi equal
to the minimum profit that any agent receives in this allocation, according to agent ai’s valuation
function. Obviously, in order to maximize MMSi, agent ai chooses an allocation that maximizes
the minimum profit of the agents. We call an allocation fair (approximately fair), if every agent ai
receives a set of items that is worth at least MMSi (a fraction of MMSi) to him.
It is easy to see that MMSi is the best possible guarantee that one can hope to obtain in this
setting. If all agents have the same valuation function, then at least one of the agents receives a
collection of items that are worth no more than MMSi to him. A natural question that emerges here
is whether a fair allocation with respect to MMSi’s is always possible? Although the experiments
are in favor of this conjecture, Procaccia and Wang [20] (EC’14) refuted this by an elegant and
delicate counterexample. They show such a fair allocation is impossible in some cases, even when
the number of agents is limited to 3. On the positive side however, they show an approximately fair
allocation can be guaranteed. More precisely, they show that there always exists an allocation in
which every agent’s profit is at least 2/3MMSi. Such an allocation is called a 2/3-MMS allocation.
Amanatidis, Markakis, Nikzad, and Saberi [2] later provided a proof for the existence of an MMS
allocation for the case, when there are large enough items and the value of each agent for every
items is drawn independently from a uniform distribution. A generalized form of this result was
later proposed by Kurokawa et al. [17] for arbitrary distributions. Caragiannis et al. [9] later proved
that the maximum Nash welfare (MNW) solution, which selects an allocation that maximizes the
product of utilities, for each agent guarantees a 2/(1 +
√
4n− 3) fraction of her MMS. In a recent
work, Ghodsi et al. [15] provided a proof for existence of a 3/4-MMS allocation.
Although it is natural to assume the agents have equal entitlements on the items, in most real-
world applications, agents have unequal entitlements on the goods. For instance, in various religions,
cultures, and regulations, the distribution of the inherited wealth is often unequal. Furthermore,
the division of mineral resources of a land or international waters between the neighboring countries
is often made unequally based on the geographic, economic, and political status of the countries.
For fairly allocating indivisible items to agents with different entitlements, two procedures are
1For instance if there is only one item, at most one agent has a non-zero profit in any allocation.
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proposed in [7]. The first one is based on Knaster’s procedure of sealed bids. In this method, we
have an auction for selling each item. Therefore, for using it all the agents should have an adequate
reserve of money which is the main issue of the procedure. The second procedure mentioned in [7]
is based on method of markers developed by William F. Lucas which is spiritually similar to the
moving knife procedure. In this method, first we line up the items, and then the agents place some
markers for dividing the items. This method suffers from high dependency of its final allocation to
the order of the items in the line.
Agent duplication is another idea to deal with unequal entitlements. More precisely, when all
of the entitlements are fractional numbers, we can duplicate each agent ai to some agents with
similar valuation functions to ai. The goal of this duplication is to reduce the problem to the case
of equal entitlements. After the allocation, every agent ai owns all of the allocated items to her
duplicated agents. For instance, assume that we have three agents with entitlements 1/2, 2/5, and
1/10, respectively. In this case, we duplicate the first agent to five agents and the second agent to
four agents each having an entitlement of 1/10. This way, we can reduce our problem to the case
of equal entitlements. Although agent duplication may be practical when the items are divisible,
in the indivisible case, this method does not apply to the indivisible setting. For instance, if the
number of the agents is higher than the number of available items, we cannot allocate anything to
some agents. Another issue with this method is that it works only for fractional entitlements.
In this paper, we study fair allocation of indivisible items with different entitlements using a
model which resolves the mentioned issues. Our fairness criterion mimics the general idea of Budish
for defining maxmin shares. Similar to Budish’s proposal, in order to define a maxmin share for
an agent ai, we ask the following question: how much benefit does agent ai expect to receive from
a fair allocation, if we were to divide the goods only based on his valuation function? If agent
ai expects to receive a profit of p from the allocation, then he should also recognize a minimum
profit of p · ej/ei for any other agent aj, so that his own profit per entitlement is a lower bound
for all agents. Therefore, a fair answer to this question is the maximum value of p for which there
exists an allocation such that agent ai’s profit-per-entitlement can be guaranteed to all other agents
(according to his own valuation function). We define the maxmin shares of the agents based on
this intuition.
Recall that we denote the number of agents with n and the entitlement of every agent ai with ei.
We assume the entitlements always add up to 1. For every agent ai, we define the weighted maxmin
share denote by WMMSi, to be the highest value of p for which there exists an allocation of the
goods to the agents in which every agent aj receives a profit of at least p · ej/ei based on agent ai’s
valuation function. Similarly, we call an allocation α-WMMS, if every agent ai obtains an α fraction
of WMMSi from his allocated goods. Notice that in case ei = 1/n for all agents, this definition
is identical to Budish’s definition. Since our model is a generalization of the Budish’s model, it is
known that a fair allocation is not guaranteed to exist for every scenario. However, whether a 2/3
approximation or in general a constant approximation WMMS allocation exists remains an open
question.
Our main result is in contrast to that of Procaccia and Wang. We settle the above question by
giving a 1/n hardness result for this problem. In other words, we show no algorithm can guarantee
any allocation which is better than 1/n-WMMS in general. We further complement this result
by providing a simple algorithm that guarantees a 1/n-WMMS allocation to all agents. As we
show in Section 2, this hardness is a direct consequence of unreasonably high valuation of agents
with low entitlements for some items. Moreover, in Section 3 we discuss that not only are such
valuation functions unrealistic, but also an agent with such a valuation function has an incentive
to misrepresent his valuations (Observation 3.1). Therefore, a natural limitation that one can add
to the setting is to assume no item is worth more than WMMSi for any agent ai. We also study
3
the problem in this mildly restricted setting and show in this case a 1/2-WMMS guarantee can be
delivered via a greedy algorithm.
In contrast to our theoretical results, we show in practice a fair allocation is likely to exist
by providing experimental results on real-world data. The source of our experiments is a publicly
available collection of bids for eBay goods and services2. Note that since those auctions are truthful3,
it is the users’ best interest to bid their actual valuations for the items and thus the market is
transparent. More details about the experiments can be found in Section 4. We also support our
claim by presenting theoretical analysis for the stochastic variants of the problem in which the
valuation of every agent for a good is drawn from a given distribution.
1.1 Our Model
Let N be a set of n agents, and M be a set of m items. Each agent ai has an additive valuation
function Vi for the items. In addition, every agent ai has an entitlement to the items, namely ei.
The entitlements add up to 1, i.e.,
∑
ei = 1.
Since our model is a generalization of maxmin share, we begin with a formal definition of the
maxmin shares for equal entitlements, proposed by Budish [8]. In this case, we assume all of the
entitlements are equal to 1/n. Let Π(M) be the set of n-partitionings of the items. Define the
maxmin share of agent ai (MMSi) of player i as
MMSi = max
〈A1,A2,...,An〉∈Π(M)
min
j∈[n]
Vi(Aj). (1)
One can interpret the maxmin share of an agent as his outcome as a divider in a divide-and-
choose procedure against adversaries [8]. Consider a situation that a cautious agent knows his own
valuation on the items, but the valuations of other agents are unknown to him. If we ask the agent
to run a divide-and-choose procedure, he tries to split the items in a way that the least valuable
bundle is as attractive as possible.
When the agents have different entitlements, the above interpretation is no longer valid. The
problem is that the agents have different entitlements and this discrepancy must somehow be
considered in the divide-and-choose procedure. Thus, we need an interpretation of the maxmin
share that takes the entitlements into account.
Let us get back to the case with the equal entitlements. Another way to interpret maxmin
share is this: suppose that we ask agent ai to fairly distribute the items in M between n agents
of N , based on his own valuation function. In an ideal situation (e.g., if the goods are completely
divisible), we expect ai to allocate a share with value Vi(M)/n to every agent. However, since
the goods are indivisible, some sort of unfairness is inevitable. For this case, we wish that ai does
his best to retain fairness. MMSi is in fact, a parameter that reveals how much fairness ai can
guarantee, regarding his valuation function.
Formally, to measure the fairness of an allocation by ai, define a value F
i
A for any allocation
A = 〈A1, A2, . . . , An〉 as
F iA =
minj Vi(Aj)
Vi(M)/n .
In fact, we wish to make sure ai reports an allocation A
∗ such that F iA∗ is as close to 1 as possible.
The maxmin share of ai is therefore defined as
MMSi = F
i
A∗(Vi(M)/n). (2)
2http://cims.nyu.edu/ munoz/data/
3An action is called truthful, if no bidder has any incentive to misrepresent his valuation
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It is easy to observe that Equations (1) and (2) are equivalent, since the fairest allocation in the
absence of different entitlements is an allocation that maximizes value of the minimum bundle:
MMSi = F
i
A∗(Vi(M)/n)
=
minj Vi(A
∗
j )
Vi(M)/n (Vi(M)/n) = minj Vi(A
∗
j )
Now, consider the case with different entitlements. Let ei be the entitlement of agent ai. Similar
to the second interpretation forMMSi, ask agent ai to fairly distribute the items between the agents,
but this time, considers the entitlements. In an ideal situation (e.g., a completely divisible resource),
we expect the allocation to be proportional to the entitlements, i.e. ai allocates a share to agent
aj with value exactly Vi(M)ej (note that when the entitlements are equal, this value equals to
Vi(M)/n for every agent). But again, such an ideal situation is very rare to happen and thus we
allow some unfairness. In the same way, define the fairness of an allocation A = 〈A1, A2, . . . , An〉
as
F iA = min
j
Vi(Aj)
Vi(M)ej (3)
Let A∗ = 〈A∗1, A∗2, . . . , A∗n〉 be an allocation by ai that maximizes F iA∗ . The weighted maxmin
share of agent ai is defined in the same way as MMSi, that is:
WMMSi = F
i
A∗Vi(M)ei = eimin
j
Vi(A
∗
j )
ej
In summery, the value WMMSi for every agent ai is defined as follows:
WMMSi = max
〈A1,A2,...,An〉∈Π(M)
min
j∈[n]
Vi(Aj)
ei
ej
.
For more intuition, consider the following example:
Example 1.1 Assume that we have two agents a1, a2 with e1 = 1/3 and e2 = 2/3. Fur-
thermore, suppose that there are 5 items b1, b2, b3, b4, b5 with the following valuations for a1:
V1({b1}) = V1({b2}) = V1({b3}) = 4, V1({b4}) = 3 and V1({b5}) = 9. For the allocation
A = 〈{b5}, {b1, b2, b3, b4}〉, we have FA = min( 924·(1/3) , 1524·(2/3) ) which means FA = 15/16. Moreover,
for allocation A′ = 〈{b1, b2}, {b3, b4, b5}〉, we have FA′ = min( 824·(1/3) , 1624·(2/3) ) which means FA′ = 1.
Thus, A′ is a fairer allocation than A. In addition, A′ is the fairest possible allocation and hence,
WMMS1 = 1 · 24 · 1/3 = 8.
Example 1.1 also gives an insight about why agent duplication (as introduced in the Introduction)
is not a good idea. For this example, if we duplicate agent a2, we have three agents with the same
entitlements. But any partitioning of the items into three bundles, results in a bundle with value
at most 7 to a1.
Finally, an allocation of the items inM to the agents in N is said to be α−WMMS, if the total
value of the share allocated to each agent ai is worth at least αWMMSi to him.
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2 A Tight 1/n Bound on the Optimal Allocation
In spite of the fact that there exists a 2/3-WMMS guarantee when all the entitlements are equal, in
our general setting surprisingly we provide a counterexample which proves that there is no guarantee
better than 1/n-WMMS. We complement this result by showing that a 1/n-WMMS always exists.
Thus, these two theorems make a tight bound for the problem.
The main property of our counterexample is a large gap between the value of items for different
agents. We provide a counterexample according to this property in Theorem 2.1.
Theorem 2.1 There exists no guarantee better than 1/n-WMMS when the entitlements to the
items may differ.
Proof. We propose an example that admits no allocation better than 1/n-WMMS. To this end,
consider an instance with n agents and 2n−1 items and let ei = ǫ for all i < n and en = 1−(n−1)ǫ.
The valuation functions of the first n − 1 agents are the same. For every agent ai with 1 ≤ i < n,
Vi({bj}) is as follows:
Vi({bj}) =


ǫ if j ≤ n− 1
1− (n− 1)ǫ if j = n
0 if j > n.
Also, for agent an we have:
Vn({bj}) =
{
1−(n−1)ǫ
n if j ≤ n
ǫ if j > n.
First, note that WMMSi = ǫ for the first n − 1 agents and WMMSn = 1 − (n − 1)ǫ. For the first
n− 1 agents, the optimal partitioning is to allocate bi to ai for all i ≤ n. Furthermore, the optimal
partitioning for an is to allocate items bn+1, bn+2, . . . , b2n−1 to the first n − 1 agents and keep the
first n items for himself. In this case, Vn({b1, b2, ..., bn}) = 1 − (n − 1)ǫ, and Vn({bn+i}) = ǫ for
1 ≤ i < n. Therefore, WMMSn = 1− (n− 1)ǫ.
On the other hand, in any allocation that guarantees a non-zero fraction of WMMS for every
agent, at most one of the items b1, b2, . . . , bn is allocated to an, since the rest of the items have
value 0 for the first n− 1 agents. Therefore, the items allocated to an are worth at most
1− (n− 1)ǫ
n
+ (n− 1)ǫ = 1/n + ǫ(n− 1− n− 1
n
) ≤ 1/n + nǫ.
to him. Thus, the best fraction of WMMS that can be guaranteed is
1/n + nǫ
1− (n− 1)ǫ (4)
Equation (4) can be made arbitrarily close to 1/n, by choosing sufficiently small ǫ. Thus, no
allocation can guarantee an approximation better than 1/n for this example.

Theorem 2.1 gives a 1/n-WMMS upper-bound. In Theorem 2.2, we show that the provided
upper-bound is tight. Algorithm 1 uses a simple greedy procedure, which is spiritually similar to
an algorithm in [2], guaranteeing 1/n-WMMS allocation as follow: sort the agents in descending
order of entitlements. Starting from the first agent, ask every person to collect the most valuable
item from the remaining set, one by one. Repeat the process until no more item is left.
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Algorithm 1: 1/n-WMMS allocation
Input: N , M, valuation functions V1, . . . , Vn, and entitlements e1, . . . , en (without loss of
generality, sorted in descending order).
Output: Allocation A = A1, . . . , An.
1
1: for i from one to |M| do
2: assign an unassigned item bj to ai mod |N | where Vi mod |N |({bj}) is maximum among
unassigned items
Theorem 2.2 Algorithm 1 guarantees a 1/n-WMMS allocation.
Proof. If the number of items is smaller than the number of agents then the proof is trivial.
Therefore, from this point on, we assume m ≥ n. Without loss of generality we assume agents are
sorted in descending order of their entitlements, that is e1 ≥ e2 . . . ≥ en. The goal is to prove that
for each agent ai he receives at least 1/n-WMMSi using Algorithm 1. Suppose that the optimal
allocation for ai is B
∗ = 〈B∗1 , . . . , B∗n〉. Without loss of generality suppose items are sorted according
to their value for ai in descending order that is:
Vi({b1}) ≥ Vi({b2}) ≥ . . . ≥ Vi({b|M|}).
We call items b1, b2, . . . , and bi−1 heavy items for ai. Let H be the set of heavy items for ai. Since
the entitlements of agents are sorted from a1 to an, for agents aj and aj′ when ej > ej′ we have:
Vi(B
∗
j ) ≥ Vi(B∗j′). (5)
Now, the goal is to prove Vi(B
∗
i ) ≤ Vi(M\H) and use it to the guarantee of the algorithm. Since
B∗i ⊆ M, if B∗i ∩H = ∅, clearly Vi(B∗i ) ≤ Vi(M\H) holds. In case B∗i ∩H 6= ∅, consider agent
ak′ where 1 ≤ k′ < i and B∗k′ ∩H = ∅. According to Inequality (5), ak′ has a greater entitlement
than ai. Therefore, we have: Vi(B
∗
k′) ≥ Vi(B∗i ) which yields that B∗k′ is worth at least Vi({bk}) for
ai where all the items of B
∗
k′ are in M−H. Therefore, we can imply that Vi(B∗i ) ≤ Vi(M\H).
The items are sorted in the descending order of their value to ai from b1 to b|M| which implies
Vi({bi}) + Vi({bn+i}) + Vi({b2n+i}) + . . . ≥ Vi(M\H)/n.
The l-th assigned item to ai by the algorithm is not worth less than Vi({b(l−1)n+i}). Hence, the
assigned items to ai is worth at least Vi({bi}) + Vi({bn+i}) + Vi({b2n+i}) + . . . for him which is not
less than Vi(M\H)/n ≥ Vi(B∗i )/n ≥ 1/n-WMMSi.

3 Allocation for the Restricted Case
In Section 2, we gave a tight 1/n-WMMS guarantee for the fair allocation problem with unequal
entitlements . In this section, we consider a reasonable restriction of the problem which gives a
1/2-WMMS guarantee. In this restricted setting the value of each item bj to each agent ai is no
more than WMMSi. Observation 3.1 shows that how this assumption can be invaluable.
Observation 3.1 If Vi(bj) ≥WMMSi, it is in the best interest of ai to report his valuation for bj
equal to infinity. Because his WMMS may increase in this way, and he achieves more items after
the allocation of the algorithm, because his WMMS may increase in this way, and he will be satisfied
even if he receives only this item.
7
Algorithm 2: 1/2-WMMS allocation for the restricted case
Input: N , M, valuation functions V1, . . . , Vn, and entitlements e1, . . . , en (without loss of
generality, sorted in descending order).
Output: Allocation A = A1, . . . , An.
1
1: while M 6= ∅ and ∃Ai where Vi(Ai) < 1/2-WMMSi do
2: define candidate set Ci = ∅ for each agent ai.
3: for bj ∈ M do
4: add bj to Ci where Vi({bj})/Vi(M)F iA∗ is maximum among all of the unsatisfied agents.
5: Choose unsatisfied agent ai and item bj in its candidate set which maximize
Vi({bj})/Vi(M)F iA∗ among all of the unsatisfied agents and items in their candidate sets.
6: Assign item bj to agent ai
In this section, we provide an algorithm with 1/2-WMMS guarantee for the restricted case of
the problem. For a case that the entitlements are equal, an algorithm, namely bag filling guarantees
1/2-WMMS for all the agents. In the bag filling algorithm, we start with an empty bag. In each
step, we add a remaining item to the bag. After each addition, if the total value of items in the bag
becomes more than 1/2-WMMSi for an unsatisfied agent ai, we allocate all the items in the bag to
him and repeat the procedure with an empty bag. After running this simple procedure, each agent
ai receives at least 1/2-WMMSi.
Our algorithm allocates the items to agents in a more clever way. We allocate an item to
an agent in each step of the algorithm until each agent ai receives at least 1/2-WMMSi by the
allocation. To this end, in each step, first the algorithm for each agent ai creates a candidate set of
items where bj is in the candidate set of ai if Vi({bj})/Vi(M)F iA∗ be the maximum number among
all of the unsatisfied agents. Then, the algorithm chooses unsatisfied agent ai and item bj in its
candidate set which maximize Vi({bj})/Vi(M)F iA∗ among all of the unsatisfied agents and items in
their candidate sets, and assigns this item to the agent.
Before proving Algorithm 2 guarantees a 1/2-WMMS allocation, we prove an auxiliary lemma
which argues that using Algorithm 2 no agent receives more than his WMMS.
Lemma 3.1 Algorithm 2 does not allocate more than WMMSi for any agent ai.
Proof. The algorithm does not assign anymore items to a satisfied agent. Hence, any satisfied
agent ai has less than 1/2-WMMSi value of items in Ai before he receives the last item. For the
sake of contradiction, suppose that the algorithm allocates more than WMMSi to ai. Without loss
of generality, suppose that the last item allocated to ai is bj . Since before allocating bj to ai he
had less than 1/2-WMMSi value of items in Ai, the value of bj to ai is more than 1/2-WMMSi.
Since Vi(bj) ≤ WMMSi, before allocating bj to ai we have Ai 6= ∅. Since Vi(bj) is more than the
value of all the other allocated items to ai, bj was not in the candidate set of ai when we were
assigning the other items to ai. Hence, bj was in the candidate set of an other agent ai′ . Therefore,
Vi′({bj})/Vi′(M)F i′A∗ ≥ Vi({bj})/Vi(M)F iA∗ . Since this value is greater than the values of all other
items in Ai, the algorithm first allocate bj to unsatisfied agent ai′ . 
Now, using Lemma 3.1, we prove the approximation guarantee of the algorithm.
Theorem 3.2 Algorithm 2 ensures a 1/2-WMMS guarantee when for each agent ai and item bj,
Vi(bj) ≤WMMSi.
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Proof. It is clear that if the algorithm satisfies all the agents, it ensures the approximation
guarantee. Now, for the sake of contradiction assume that there exists an unsatisfied agent ai at
the end of the algorithm. For each item bj we define
v′bj = Vi′(bj)/Vi′(M)F i
′
A∗
where ai′ is the recipient of bj in the allocation. Since v
′
bj
is maximal according to the algorithm,
and ai is not a satisfied agent, we have:
Vi(bj)/Vi(M)F iA∗ ≤ Vi′(bj)/Vi′(M)F i
′
A∗ . (6)
Lemma 3.1 implies that
∑
bj
v′bj ≤ 1, and since we have at least one unsatisfied agent we can write:∑
bj
v′bj < 1. (7)
Inequality (6) along with Inequality (7) implies∑
bj
Vi(bj)/Vi(M)F iA∗ < 1. (8)
Finally Inequality (8) yields that
∑
bj
Vi(bj) < Vi(M)F iA∗ which is a contradiction. 
4 Empirical Results
As we discussed in Section 2, in extreme cases, making aWMMS allocation or even an approximately
WMMS allocation is theoretically impossible. However, our counter-example is extremely delicate
and thus very unlikely to happen in real-world. Here, we show in practice fair allocations w.h.p
exist, especially when the number of items is large.
We draw the valuation of the agents for the goods based on a collection of bids for eBay items
publicly available at http://cims.nyu.edu/ munoz/data/. More precisely, for m items, we randomly
choose m different categories of goods from the dataset. Moreover, for every agent ai and item bj ,
we set Vi({bj}) to a submitted bid for the corresponding category of item bj chosen uniformly at
random. The bids vary from 0.01 to 113.63 and their mean is 6.57901. Moreover, the expected
variance of the bids in every category is 200.513.
For an instance of the problem with n agents and m items, we run the experiments with
1000 different vector of entitlements drawn from the uniform distribution (and scaled up to satisfy∑
ei = 1). For every n and m, we take the minimum WMMS guarantee obtained all 1000 runs,
and show it in Figures 1 and 2. We used heuristic algorithms to compute the maxmin shares and
maxmin guarantees. Thus, our results are only lower bounds to the actual WMMS guarantees.
Nonetheless, the optimal guarantees are very close to the estimated ones.
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the result of the runs for n = 10, n = 50, and n = 200 respectively.
Figure 1 only depicts the WMMS guarantees for m ∈ [n, 2n] whereas in Figure 2 the number of
items varies from n to n2.
As shown in Figures 1 and 2, the approximation guarantee improves as we increase the number
of items. Moreover, unless m is very close to n, a WMMS allocation exists in our experiments
(notice that the guarantee is above 1 when m is considerably larger that n).
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Figure 1: The vertical line denotes the ratio of the valuation of the allocated set to the maxmin
guarantee of the agents. The horizontal line shows the number of items varying from n to 2n.
Blue, red, and yellow poly lines illustrate the performance of our algorithm for n = 10, n = 50, and
n = 200 respectively.
5 Stochastic Setting
In Section 2 we presented a counterexample to show that no allocation better than 1/n-WMMS
can be guaranteed. However, the construction described in the counterexample is very unlikely
to happen in the real settings. Here, we show that WMMS allocation exists with high probability
when a small randomness is allowed in the setting.
Considering stochastic settings is common in the fair allocation problems since many real-world
instances can be modeled with random distributions [8, 17, 2, 13]. The general probabilistic model
used in previous works is as follows: every agent ai has a probability distribution Di over [0, 1] and
for every item bj, the value for Vi({bj}) is randomly sampled from Di. In [2], the existence of an
MMS allocation is proved for the special case of Di = U(0, 1), where U(0, 1) is the standard uniform
distribution with minimum 0 and maximum 1. Kurokawa, Procaccia, and Wang [17] considered
the problem for arbitrary random distribution Di with the condition that V[Di] ≥ c for a positive
constant c. A considerable part of the proof for the existence of anMMS allocation in [17] is referred
to [13], where the authors proved the existence of an envy-free allocation in the stochastic settings
with arbitrary random distributions.
In this section, we consider two different probabilistic models. Our first model is the same as [17],
with the exception that we omit the restriction V[Di] ≥ c. We name this model as Stochastic Agents
model. In the second model, every item bi has a probability distribution Di and for every agent aj ,
value of Vj({bi}) is randomly drawn from Di. We choose the name Stochastic Items for the second
model. We believe that Stochastic Items model is more realistic since the first model does not make
any distinguish between the items. None of the previous works mentioned above considered this
model.
We leverage Hoeffding inequality to prove the existence of WMMS allocation. Theorem 5.1
states the general form of this inequality [16].
Theorem 5.1 (General Form of Hoeffding (1963)) Let X1,X2, . . . ,Xn be random variables
10
Figure 2: The vertical line denotes the ratio of the valuation of the allocated set to the maxmin
guarantee of the agents. The horizontal line shows the number of items varying from n to n2.
Blue, red, and yellow polylines illustrate the performance of our algorithm for n = 10, n = 50, and
n = 200 respectively.
bounded by the interval [0, 1] : 0 ≤ Xi ≤ 1. We define the empirical mean of these variables by
X¯ = 1n(X1 +X2 + . . . +Xn). Then, the following inequality holds:
P(|X¯ − E(X¯)| ≥ t) ≤ 2e−2nt2 (9)
Regarding Theorem 5.1, let X = nX¯ =
∑
iXi and let µ = n× E(X¯). By Inequality (9), we have:
P(|X − µ| ≥ nt) ≤ 2e−2nt2 (10)
By setting nt = δµ, we rewrite Equation (10) as:
P(|X − µ| ≥ δµ) ≤ 2e−2(δµ)
2
n (11)
5.1 Model I: Stochastic Agents
As mentioned before, in the first model we assume that every agent has a probability distribution
Di and for every item bj , the value of Vi({bj}) is randomly sampled from Di. Furthermore, we
suppose µi = E(Di). Throughout this section, we assume that m ≥ n. This is w.l.o.g , because for
the case m < n, WMMSi for every agent ai equals to zero. For the Stochastic Agents model, we
state Theorem 5.2.
Theorem 5.2 Consider an instance of the fair allocation problem with unequal entitlements, such
that the value of every item for every agent ai is randomly drawn from distribution Di. Furthermore,
let s = mini si and µ = mini µi. Then, for every 0 < ǫ < 1, there exists a value m
′ = m′(1e ,
1
µ ,
1
ǫ )
(which means m′ is a function of 1e ,
1
µ ,
1
ǫ ) such that if m ≥ m′, then almost surely a (1− ǫ)-WMMS
allocation exists.
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In the rest of this section, we prove Theorem 5.2. Consider the algorithm that allocates ti =
⌊mei⌋ items to every agent ai. We know that the value of item bi for agent aj is randomly sampled
from Di. From the point of view of the algorithm, it trivially does not matter whether the value
of items are sampled after the allocation or before the allocation. Thus, we can suppose that the
value of every item is sampled after the allocation of items.
For now, we know that ti = ⌊mei⌋ number of items are assigned to ai. Argue that for every
ǫ > 0, there exists a value m′, such that for every m ≥ m′, ti ≥ mei(1− ǫ). In Lemma 5.3 we bound
the value of m′ in terms of ei and ǫ.
Lemma 5.3 For every m > 1ǫei , ⌊mei⌋ ≥ mei(1− ǫ).
Proof. We know ⌊mei⌋ ≥ mei − 1 = mei(1 − 1mei ). If m > 1ǫei , then ⌊mei⌋ ≥ mei(1 − 11
ǫei
ei
) =
mei(1− ǫ). This, completes the proof. 
For the rest of the proof, suppose that m > 1ǫei . Let Xi be the variable indicating total value
of items allocated to ai. Note that E(Xi) = tiµi. Regarding Equation (11), we have:
P(|Xi − tiµi| ≥ δtiµi) ≤ 2e
−2(δtiµi)
2
ti
We want to choose δ such that P(|Xi − tiµi| ≥ δtiµi) ≤ 12mn . We have:
2e
−2(δtiµi)
2
ti ≤ 1
2mn
⇒ −2(δtiµi)2 ≤ ti ln 1
4mn
⇒ δ ≥
√
ti ln 4mn
2(tiµi)2
Regarding the facts that ti ≥ mei(1− ǫ) and m ≥ n, we have:√
ti ln 4mn
2(tiµi)2
≤
√
ln 2 + lnm
eimµi2(1− ǫ)
Therefore, it’s enough to choose δ such that
δ ≥
√
ln 2 + lnm
eimµi2(1− ǫ) . (12)
Now, let t′i be the number of items that are not assigned to ai. Since ti+ t
′
i = m, regarding the
fact that ti ≥ mei(1− ǫ), we have t′i ≤ m−mei(1− ǫ), which means t′i ≤ m+mei(ǫ− 1). On the
other hand, t′i ≥ m(1− ei). Also, let X ′i be the variable indicating total value of the items that are
not allocated to ai. By the same deduction as ti for t
′
i we have:
P(|X ′i − t′iµi| ≥ δ′t′iµi) ≤ 2e
−2(δ′t′iµi)
2
t′
i .
Let δ′ be the value that P(|Xi − t′iµi| ≥ δt′iµi) < 12mn . We have:
2e
−2(δ′t′iµi)
2
t′
i ≤ 1
2mn
⇒ (δ′t′iµi)2 ≥
t′i ln 4mn
2
δ′ ≥
√
ln 4mn
2t′iµ
2
i
(13)
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Thus, it’s enough to choose δ in a way that Inequality (13) holds. Regarding the facts that
m > n and t′i ≥ m(1− ei), √
ln 4mn
2t′iµ
2
i
≤
√
ln 2 + lnm
m(1− ei)µi2 .
Therefore, it’s enough to choose δ′ in a way that
δ′ ≥
√
ln 2 + lnm
m(1− ei)µi2 (14)
Now, suppose that both Inequalities (12) and (14) are held. Considering Si as the set of items
assigned to ai, with the probability of at least 1− ( 12mn + 12mn) = 1− 1mn we have:
Vi(Si)
Vi(M) =
(1− δ)tiµi
(1 + δ)tiµi + (1 + δ′)t
′
iµi
It is easy to show that, there always exist an m′i such that for all m ≥ m′i both Inequalities (12)
and (14) hold for δ = ǫ and δ′ = ǫ. Regarding this, we have:
Vi(Si)
Vi(M) ≥
(1− ǫ)tiµi
(1 + ǫ)tiµi + (1 + ǫ)t′iµi
=
(1− ǫ)ti
(1 + ǫ)m
≥ (1− ǫ)mei(1− ǫ)
(1 + ǫ)m
=
(1− ǫ)2
1 + ǫ
ei =
(1 + ǫ)2 − 4ǫ
1 + ǫ
ei
= (1 + ǫ)ei − 4ǫ
(1 + ǫ)
ei
≥ (1 + ǫ)ei − 4ǫei = (1− 3ǫ)ei
Therefore, with the probability at least 1− 1mn we have:
∀ai∈N
Vi(Si)
Vi(M) ≥ (1− 3ǫ)ei (15)
Now, suppose that the Inequality 15 holds for every agent ai, with probability at least 1 − 1mn .
Considering all the agents, with the probability at least (1 − 1mn)n ≥ 1 − nnm = 1 − 1m , value of
Vi(Si)
Vi(M)
for every agent ai is at least ei(1−3ǫ). Regarding the fact that WMMSi ≤ eiVi(M), we have
∀ai∈N Vi(Si) ≥WMMSi(1− 3ǫ)
This completes the proof.
5.2 Model II: Stochastic Items
As mentioned, in Stochastic Items model, every item bi has a probability distribution Di and the
value of every agent aj for item bi is randomly chosen from Di. For this model, we prove Theorem
5.4. The theorem states that for large enough m, almost surely a (1− ǫ)-WMMS allocation exists.
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Theorem 5.4 Suppose that for every agent ai, E(Di) > c for a non-negative constant c. Then
for all 0 < ǫ < 1, there exists m′ = m′(c, ǫ, n, e1, ..., en) such that if m ≥ m′, then, almost surely,
(1− ǫ)-WMMS allocation exists.
In the rest of the section, we prove Theorem 5.4. First, in Lemma 5.6 we prove the existence of an
allocation that assigns to every agent ai, a set of items with value at least WMMSi −Mi, where
Mi = maxj(Vi({bj})). The idea to prove this fact is inspired by [4]. Argue that we can formulate
the allocation problem with unequal entitlements as the following Integer program:∑
bj∈M
Vi({bj}) · fi,j ≥ V (M) · ei ∀ai∈N∑
ai∈N
fi,j = 1 ∀bj∈M
fi,j ∈ {0, 1}
(16)
In IP(16), variable fi,j determines whether bj is assigned to agent ai or not. Considering the fact
that Vi(M) · ei is a trivial upper bound on WMMSi, any solution to IP16 is a feasible solution to
the assignment problem with unequal entitlements. By relaxing the second and the third condition,
we can convert IP16 to LP17: ∑
bj∈M
Vi({bj}) · fi,j ≥ V (M) · ei ∀ai∈N∑
ai∈N
fi,j ≤ 1 ∀bj∈M
fi,j ≥ 0
(17)
For every feasible solution A to LP17, we construct the bipartite graph GA〈I, J,E〉 where I =
{1, 2, ..., n} and J = {1, 2, ..,m} correspond to the set of players and items, respectively. An edge
i, j is included if fi,j > 0. Then by the same way used by [4], we will prove the following theorem.
Lemma 5.5 There exists a solution A′ to LP17, such that GA is a pseudoforest. (each component
of the graph is either a tree or a tree with an extra edge)
Proof. We have mn+m+ n inequalities defining the polytope of feasible solutions of LP17. We
have mn variables fi,j, therefore every solution which is located in the corner of polytope satisfies
at least mn inequalities as equalities and there will be at most m + n non-zero variables in these
solutions. By the same method used by [4], it is clear to show that if A′ is corresponding solution
to a corner of polytope, then GA′ is a pseudoforest. 
We call the solution with the property defined in Lemma 5.5 as constrained solution. In [4] it
is shown that every constrained solution for LP17, can be converted to a solution for IP16, such
that every agent ai loses at most one item bj where fi,j > 0.
Lemma 5.6 There exists an allocation in which every agent ai gets at least WMMSi −
maxj Vi({bj}).
Proof. The polytope of of feasible solutions of LP17 is non-empty, because it has at least one
solution which is, fi,j =
1
ei
for every agent ai and item bj. Therefore there exists a constrained
solution for LP17, and using the same method in [4] this solution can be converted to a solution
for IP16, such that every agent loses at most one item. 
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Proofs of Lemmas 5.5 and 5.6 are omitted and included in the full version.
Now we show that there exists m′i = m
′
i(c, ǫ, n, e1, ..., en), such that if m ≥ m′i, then, WMMSi ≥
1
ǫ
with the probability at least 1 − 1
mn
. Therefore, whenever m ≥ max(m′1,m′2, ...,m′n), with the
probability at least (1− 1
mn
)n ≥ 1− n
nm
= 1− 1
m
, for every agent ai, WMMSi ≥ 1
ǫ
. According to
Lemma 5.6, there is an allocation in which every agent gets at least
WMMSi −max
j
Vj({bj}) ≥WMMSi − 1
≥WMMSi(1− 1
WMMSi
)
≥WMMSi(1− ǫ)
Therefore, a (1− ǫ)−WMMS allocation is guaranteed to exist with the probability at least 1− 1
m
.
Lemma 5.7 Suppose that for every agent aj, E(Dj) > c for a non-negative constant c. Then for
all 0 < ǫ < 1, there exists m′i = m
′
i(c, ǫ, n, e1, ..., en) such that if m ≥ m′i, WMMSi ≥
1
ǫ
with the
probability at least 1− 1
mn
.
Proof. If there exists a partition of M, π = B1, B2, ..., Bn in which Vi(Bj) ≥ 1
ǫei
for every agent
aj , then:
WMMSi ≥ ei ·min( 1
ǫeie1
, ...,
1
ǫeien
) ≥ min( 1
ǫe1
, ...,
1
ǫen
) ≥ 1
ǫ
(18)
Suppose that m =
α
ǫ
, then for every item bk and every agent aj , we assign this item to this agent
with the probability ej . Let Xj,k be a random variable that takes the value Vi({bk}) with the
probability ej and 0 otherwise. We have E[Xj,k] >
c
ej
. Let Xj =
∑m
k=1Xj,k. By setting nt = γ,
we rewrite Equation (10) as:
P(|X − µ| ≥ γ) ≤ 2e−2γ
2
n (19)
E(Xj) will be at least
αc
ǫej
. Regarding Equation (19), we have:
P (|Xj − E(Xj)| ≥ αc
ǫej
− 1
ǫei
) ≤ 2e
−2ǫ
α
(
αc
ǫej
−
1
ǫei
)2
⇒ P (|Xj − E(Xj)| ≥ αc
ǫej
− 1
ǫei
) ≤ 2e
−2
ǫα
(
αc
ej
−
1
ei
)2
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Let αj be the value that P (|Xj − E(Xj)| ≥ αjc
ǫej
− 1
ǫei
) ≤ 1
mn2
, then:
2e
−2
ǫαj
(
αjc
ej
−
1
ei
)2
≤ 1
mn2
⇒ 2e
−2
ǫαj
(
αjc
ej
−
1
ei
)2
≤ ǫ
αjn2
⇒ 2
ǫαj
(
αjc
ej
− 1
ei
)2 ≥ ln(2αjn
2
ǫ
)
⇒ 2αjc
2
ǫe2j
+
2
ǫαje
2
i
− 4c
ǫeiej
≥ ln(2αjn
2
ǫ
)
⇒ 2αjc
2
ǫe2j
+
2
ǫαje2i
− ln(αj) ≥ 4c
ǫeiej
+ ln(
2n2
ǫ
)
Since the right hand side of the inequality is a constant, and the left hand side is an increasing
function on its domain, we can find an α′j such that whenever αj ≥ α′j, this inequality holds.
Therefore, Vi(Bj) ≥ 1
ǫei
with the probability at least 1 − 1
mn2
whenever αj ≥ α′j . Thus, by
choosing proper α such that for all aj ∈ N , α ≥ α′j, WMMSi would not be less than
1
ǫ
with the
probability at least (1− 1
mn2
)n ≥ 1− 1
mn
. 
6 Discussion
In this work we conduct a study of fair allocation when the agents have different entitlements. The
original notion of maxmin share is proposed for the case where all agents are the same in terms of
the entitlements. We extend this notion to the case of different entitlement and show that unlike
the symmetric case, when the entitlements are different, finding an almost WMMS allocation is
not always possible. More precisely, we show that the best allocation that one can hope for is a
1/n-WMMS allocation and that such an allocation can be obtained via a somewhat round-robin
procedure.
Our experimental results show that in reality, finding a WMMS allocation is very likely. Of
course this is in contrast to our theoretical results. Therefore, it is important to study the problem
under reasonable restrictions that rule out the unlikely worst-case scenarios. We initiate this
study by considering two limitations to the problem and show substantially better results for these
restricted cases. First, we show that if the valuations of the agents for the items are limited by
their maxmin share, one can devise a greedy algorithm to achieve a 1/2-WMMS allocation. We
then proceed by studying the case where the valuations of the agents for the items are drawn from
known distributions. We show that in these cases, a WMMS allocation exists with high probability.
Although these observations partially justify our empirical results, it seems that the problem
is not yet well understood when it comes to real-world settings. Therefore, we believe that future
work can investigate this problem under other reasonable and realistic assumptions and further
explain why almost fair allocations can be guaranteed in practice.
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